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mative framework.44 Such an avenue of research may very well yield dividends. 
As previously discussed, minus an external balancer, East Asia is not capable 
of balancing China. Moreover, the existence of an external balancer is, histori-
cally speaking, a relatively recent phenomenon. Given that the vast majority of 
East Asian history has taken place within a unipolar system, it is possible that 
regional norms have developed in such as way so as to be tolerant of a powerful 
China. 
 While Kang implies that a more constructivist approach to understand-
ing regional dynamics might be called for, another option may be to utilize 
balance-of-threat theory as articulated by Stephen M. Walt. However, Walt’s 
framework represents more a starting point than a definitive answer. Of his four 
determinants of threat (aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and 
offensive intentions), only one — the lack of perceived offensive intentions 
— argues in favor of the absence of balancing that we see today. Bearing this 
in mind, appraising the relative salience of these four threat indicators and the 
breadth of their applicability may constitute one particularly constructive av-
enue of inquiry for those seeking to understand what the future holds in this 
“Pacific Century.” PEAR
44  Kang, China Rising, 203.
Most of the analysis trying to understand East Asian integration in recent 
years has focused primarily on the study of bilateral FTAs or the ASEAN 
process as the center of gravity for regionalism. However, after the Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis in 1997-1998, the ASEAN Plus Three process involving Japan, 
South Korea and China was consolidated. This is just one example of how 
the focus of regionalism for the first time became East Asian wide, and the 
potential new center of gravity for regional institutionalization shifted to the 
northeast region. Institutionalization is a novel practice for policymakers 
in this region, particularly in the most advanced and developed economies 
of Northeast Asia. The focus of this paper is on South Korea, which is tak-
ing a very proactive role in regional affairs, especially when it comes to the 
building of regional institutions and the creation of regional governance. 
Foreign policymakers in Seoul have been busy in recent years with position-
ing the ROK as the hub for Northeast Asian regional integration, trying to 
estblish South Korea as a bridge between the two traditional competitors for 
leadership and influence in Asia: Japan and China. As a major power in the 
region, South Korea appears to have the capacity to take up a leadership 
role, particularly in regards to the institutionalization of Northeast Asia. 
The main purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of South Korea’s 
on the processes of institutionalization in Northeast Asia. By looking at the 
foreign policy choices and the approach to regionalism of current and previ-
ous administrations, the impact appears to be positive. 
Introduction: East Asian North-South Institutional Gap
The construction of an East Asian Community, as a long term goal, cannot be 
realized in the absence of strong political will and leadership, which must stem 
from the institutionalization of cooperation among the regional power and big-
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gest economies of NEA, namely China and Japan. However, due to historical 
differences, rivalry, competition and even some territorial disputes among the 
two, South Korea — as the other most advanced country in the region — ap-
pears to have the capacity to affect these processes and take up the leadership 
vacancy; hence forming a bridge between the two Northeast Asian powers and 
also helping to reduce the institutional gap between Northeast and Southeast 
Asia. The first question that arises is why China or Japan would want South 
Korea to assume leadership responsibilities in terms of regional institutionaliza-
tion. China, Japan and South Korea’s economic interdependence due to increas-
ing intraregional trade — plus a series of transnational common problems that 
require their collective action — makes the need for institutionalization of re-
gional cooperation an objective reality. Nevertheless, in light of the differences 
and mistrust that prevails between all the parties, Beijing and Tokyo appear 
to feel more comfortable dealing with Seoul. From a Chinese point of view, 
they also share with the Koreans a conflictive relationship with Japan due to 
Japan’s imperial history. On a citizen level the perception of Japan and the way 
it has dealt with the history remains mostly negative in both countries.1 From a 
Japanese perspective, the ROK is considered part of the same side, since both 
countries are US allies, democracies and they both prefer a more open and pro-
Western approach to the region. 
In this sense, this paper argues that the Republic of Korea — under-
stood as a middle power — should be considered a leading actor in the pro-
cesses of regional institutionalization in East Asia. What are the particular char-
acteristics of its leadership role and its approach to regional institutionalization? 
In which ways have these been manifested in the past and in recent years? These 
issues will be addressed by looking at the relationship between the particular 
kind of regional leadership exerted by South Korea and the institutionaliza-
tion processes of East Asia from an inter-governmentalist perspective. This ap-
proach derives from both neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism. It shares 
with the former the emphasis on economic interests as the principal driving 
1  Berger argues that in the relationship with its neighbors Japan’s soft power constitutes that of a 
hard case, as its image suffers from severe liabilities. Berger exposes a 2006 study in which 71 percent of 
Chinese have a negative view of Japan. Also Kim shows how the same year over 72 percent of the people in 
South Korea perceived Japan with distrust. See Thomas Berger, “Japan in Asia: A Hard Case for Soft Power,” 
Orbis 54, issue 4 (Fall 2010): 565-582; and Byung-kook Kim, “Between China, America, and North Korea: 
South Korea’s Hedging,” in China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, eds. 
Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (New York: Cornell University, 2008), 191-217. 
force of regional integration, which coincides with the latter on stressing the im-
portance of regional institutions as the means to achieve and secure integration. 
However, it differs from earlier approaches as it gives a central role to national 
governments.2 Therefore, it is relevant to distinguish between the different types 
of regional processes. Regionalism refers to the conscious and deliberate at-
tempts by national states and governments to create formal mechanisms for 
dealing with common transnational issues through inter-governmental dialogue 
and treaty, and the creation of regional governance as an outcome of this. By 
contrast, regionalization is conceived as an undirected process of growing in-
terdependence that originates in the actions of individuals, groups and corpora-
tions rather than through the deliberate actions of national governments.3 These 
two types of processes are not mutually exclusive, and many see regionalism as 
a response to regionalization. 
Regional institutionalization is at the core of that transition and par-
ticularly in East Asia it is better understood from an inter-governmentalist per-
spective since the issue of sovereignty remains a contentious point in the region. 
This happens because most models of regional institutionalization, particularly 
those followed by European nations, imply a considerable amount of sover-
eignty delegation onto supranational entities. In East Asia that “intellectual leap 
over more bounded notions of sovereignty”4 has not occurred despite the high 
degree of economic interdependence, and indeed it is unlikely that East Asia 
will follow the European model of “sovereignty pooling.” Instead a kind of 
“regulatory regionalism” based upon inter-governmental efforts is appearing in 
this part of the world. This carries fewer negative connotations for sovereign-
ty and regime autonomy because “institution building” in the most traditional 
sense implied some sovereignty pooling aspects that alarmed East Asian re-
gional leaders. In contrast, they have opted for delegating to the state whatever 
policy coordination necessary, and this is how institutionalization from an inter-
governmentalist point of view can act as a sovereignty enhancing mechanism.5 
2  Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International 
Economic Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
3 Shaun Breslin, “Greater China and the Political Economy of Regionalization,” East Asia 21, no.1 
(2004): 9.
4  Richard A. Higgott and Martina Timmermann, “Institutionalizing East Asia: Learning Lessons 
from Europe on Regionalism, Regionalization, Identity and Leadership,” in Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: 
Regional steps towards Global Governance, eds. Martina Timmermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Tokyo: Unit-
ed Nations University Press, 2008), 52.
5  Ibid., 56.
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The creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative after the AFC is a recent example in 
this sense, as the fi rst steps towards East Asian-wide institutionalization imply-
ing a form of institution — the APT framework — and governance in the form 
of fi nancial assistance.6 However, Rozman argues that the future challenge for 
East Asia lies in the establishment of an institutionalized community that takes 
China, Japan and South Korea as the core.7 Figure 1 depicts this problematiza-
tion. The ascending arrows illustrate the processes this article pays attention to, 
while the big feedback arrows are included to show both how they reinforce and 
consolidate institutionalization in the region, as well as the roles of the different 
actors involved.
6  Signed in May, 2000 in the city of Chiang Mai, Thailand, this initiative created a network of 
bilateral arrangements among the APT members, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea with the ASEAN 
countries. This pact provided fi nancing for members, which may encounter liquidity problems. In 2009 an 
agreement was reached to replace the complicated bilateral swap agreements for a comprehensive multilateral 
arrangement that created a single fund to help with managing regional fi nancial crises, which represents the 
fi rst successful regionalist project of the APT grouping. 
7  Gilbert Rozman, “Northeast Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads: Is an East Asian Community in 
sight?” in Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional steps towards Global Governance, eds. Martina Tim-
mermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008), 83-97.
Figure 1: Main Proposal
South Korea’s Leadership as a Middle Power 
Much has been written and theorized in regard to the issue of regional leader-
ship when it comes to East Asia, as many scholars expected the PRC and/or 
Japan to play a similar role Germany and France played in the evolution of the 
EU. However, the two regional powers have not been able to agree and lead 
together the institutionalization process, which is often regarded as very hard 
to achieve in East Asia. Clearly, in any process of regional institutionalization, 
leadership is a key element, especially if the aim is to pursue a regional com-
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East Asia to narrow the asymmetry with the West (and the US in particular), the 
region needs to enhance its collective institutional decision-making capabilities: 
“For this to occur, endogenous regional leadership needs to strengthen.”8 South 
Korea appears to be the most suitable candidate to take up this role, as a demo-
cratic and economically developed state. Rozman explains: “South Korea is the 
natural center of Northeast Asia and is best positioned to draw others together. 
President Kim Dae-jung became the leading advocate of APT and also the EAS; 
and President Roh Moo-hyun took office making a strong appeal for regional-
ism in NEA.”9 Moreover, the future of regional arrangements like these depends 
more on the industrialized Northeast Asian countries than in the ASEAN 10 
members since the Southeast Asia “bridge” for regionalism that worked for a 
time seems today unlikely to carry it much further.10 An East Asian regional 
framework indeed requires the institutionalization of NEA with endogenous 
leadership driving the process. 
The use of the concept of “middle power” is more or less recent and it 
materialized as a valid analytical tool only in a post-Cold War world. The emer-
gence of new actors and the increasing relevance of the so-called “low politics” 
— economic, cultural, social or even environmental issues — in international 
relations, have given smaller or medium-sized countries more room and op-
portunities to pursue a more active participation in the international community. 
Jordaan defines middle powers as: “states that are neither great nor small in 
terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propen-
sity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system.”11 Usually several 
characteristics are taken into consideration when trying to identify middle pow-
ers, most commonly the state capabilities that position them in the world order 
but also the role and influence of their foreign policy. Cooper, Higgott and Nos-
sal argue that the common approach to middle powers through position in the 
international hierarchy has its problems as it relies too heavily on quantifiable 
measures of power.12
8  Higgott and Timmermann, “Institutionalizing East Asia,” 54.
9  Rozman, “Northeast Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads,” 85.
10  Ibid., 90.
11  Eduard Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relation: distinguishing be-
tween emerging and traditional Middle Powers,” Politikon 30, no. 2 (2003): 165.
12  Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: 
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 
17.
Thus, a comprehensive understanding of middle powers is the favored 
option here to understand South Korea’s regional leadership. A geographic ap-
proach to this issue is first considered, which suggests that a middle power 
state is a state physically located “in the middle” between other great powers.13 
This obviously has a strong regional component and fits well the case of South 
Korea. A second approach is the so-called normative view of middle powers, 
which sees them as somewhat “wiser or more virtuous” countries as compared 
to the rest, and thus they are considered to be more “trustworthy because they 
can exert diplomatic influence without the likelihood of recourse to force.”14 
This idea is more closely related to the reputation that a certain country — usu-
ally a democratic one — has, and it definitely serves the argument of positive 
public image that Seoul has been trying to pursue internationally by hosting 
various events and by supporting certain international causes. 
More important though, is the behavioral approach, which focuses on 
the particular style of behavior that the so-called middle powers often display in 
the international arena. This is characterized by their preference for multilater-
alism, their ability to embrace compromise in certain disputes and the implicit 
notion of “good international citizenship” in their diplomacy. This emphasis on 
behavior implies that “middlepowership,” is not a static feature but instead it 
is modified over time according to the changes in the international system, as 
“there is the possibility that followers may adopt leadership roles.”15 Indeed, 
although today it is possible to see how South Korea can be considered as a 
middle power, this remains a recent development in its international status. Jor-
daan’s differentiation of middle powers into ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ middle 
powers is helpful:
Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, 
social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviorally they exhibit 
a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct 
from powerful states in their regions. […] Emerging middle powers by con-
trast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratized 
states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behav-
iorally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong 
regional orientation favoring regional integration but seek also to construct 
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid., 18.
15  Ibid., 21.
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identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.16
South Korea in particular, represents this dichotomy well, Robertson argues. 
Due to its physical, economic and military capabilities, the ROK is often placed 
in a higher position within the global hierarchy according to most traditional 
measurements of power.17 Indeed, South Korea’s population in 2007 was 48 
million people, ranking the ROK 23rd in the world; additionally, the OECD 
in the same year ranked South Korea as the thirteenth largest economy in the 
world with a GDP of $957 billion. Moreover, according to the US Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) 2005 Factbook, the South Korean military expenditure 
of $21 billion per year ranked it eighth in the world. All these are of course in-
dicators that relate to the more material aspects of power. Nevertheless, foreign 
policy behavior tell us more when trying to identify a middle power, since these 
types of states usually opt for one or many possible roles as a regional leader; 
acting as a bridge or mediator and/or as a manager for institution building. 
Although Robertson points out that “South Korea’s foreign policy be-
havior has not reflected the internationalist tendencies we associate with middle 
powers such as Sweden, Norway, Canada, and Australia,”18 this has been chang-
ing since the 1990s. Accordingly, Robertson proposes that the ROK’s case may 
well constitute that of an evolution, from emerging middle power to a more 
traditional middle power. This evolution manifests particularly in Seoul’s for-
eign policy behavior and the role that it has assumed both at regional and global 
levels. The active participation of South Korea in the G20 process is the clearest 
example of the latter and what the government of Lee Myung-bak has called the 
“Global Korea” strategy. As I will demonstrate, particularly at the regional lev-
el, Seoul has displayed early signs of leadership in the wake of the 21st century.
However, some are critical of South Korea’s real capacity to act as 
a regional leader for several reasons, citing among them primarily the antago-
nistic sentiment towards Japan amongst the Korean public and their skepticism 
of China.19 Indeed, these are relevant and objective trends within the citizenry. 
16  Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations,” 165.
17  Jeffrey Robertson, “South Korea as a Middle Power: Capacity, Behavior, and Now Opportunity,” 
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 16, no. 1 (2007): 153. 
18  Ibid.
19  Kim exposes quantifiable data of surveys conducted among the Korean public to argue that the 
negative perceptions they have of the neighboring countries impedes South Korea to develop a constructive 
regional cooperation strategy. See Kim, “Between China, America, and North Korea,” 191-217. 
Still, the perceptions of the general public do not mean that official foreign 
policy options must follow the same approach. Decision-making at such high 
levels is usually carried out by elites that understand better the implications and 
necessity of regional cooperation. In addition, South Korea’s inability to deal 
with the North and the constraints brought about by its dependency on the US 
for security are other reasons put forward by those who are skeptical of Seoul 
as a regional leader or bridge. For instance, Kim Byung-kook chooses to focus 
only on ROK’s security dilemma from a realist point of view to argue that it can 
hardly be considered a regional leader because it has failed in acting as a media-
tor between North Korea and America. This approach has its limitations, and if 
the focus is instead put on foreign policy behavior towards regional cooperation 
and not in the stalemate that dealing with Pyongyang usually entails for Seoul, 
then the picture looks more positive. From an inter-governmentalist point of 
view where the emphasis is put on the interactions of states at a governmental 
level, there is no reason to argue that Seoul’s regional policies cannot display 
middle power behavior. Moreover, Kim not only focuses his critique on one 
single administration — the Roh Moo-hyun administration from 2003 to 2008 
— he also argues that President Roh’s main mistake was to have miscalculated 
South Korea’s capabilities, opting for a great power strategy instead of that of 
a middle power.20 Thus, Kim’s argument does not entirely contradict that of 
this paper, and it actually helps to validate the importance of understanding the 
ROK’s position as a middle power in East Asia. 
In order to do so, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s proposal is central as 
it helps to identify these “middlepowership behavioral patterns” in three phases: 
first as catalyst; where middle powers take the lead by providing the intellectual 
and political energy to promote certain initiatives. Second as facilitator; where 
middle powers focus on coalition building in order to support issue-specific 
agenda-setting efforts. This type of work is relevant as it entails aspects like 
the planning and hosting of formative meetings and the setting of priorities for 
future collective action. Finally, another way in which a middle power can exert 
leadership is as a manager. In this context, a heavy emphasis is put on institution 
building and confidence building, the development of norms and the use of for-
mal and informal fora.21 This allows us to understand the many ways regional 
leadership can be exerted, where leadership is distinguished from hegemony; as 
20  Kim, “Between China, America, and North Korea: South Korea’s Hedging,” 194.
21  Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, Relocating middle powers, 24-25.
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Higgott and Timmermann put it, “leadership is not just economic and military 
preponderance. Leadership can be intellectual and inspirational.”22
Seoul’s Early Signs of Leadership 
Most of the analysis set the end of the Cold War as the backdrop for East Asia to 
start thinking about ways to promote cooperation and security on a multilateral 
basis for a region that nevertheless is until today highly determined by strong 
bilateral relationships. It would not be entirely inaccurate to say that South Ko-
rea is not different and it only began to engage East Asian regionalism in a 
systematic manner in the 1990s. However, some trace Seoul’s interest in region-
alism to as early as the 1940s. Park Young-june, an expert in Korean foreign 
policy, military and security affairs, emphasizes that “from an early stage the 
ROK has been interested in the building of regional institutions primarily due 
to the necessity of safeguarding its own security at first, but later also because 
of the need to propel its economic development.”23 To illustrate, Park points to 
the First Republic’s President, Syngman Rhee and his 1949 speech in which he 
proposed a Pacific Alliance with the US, the Philippines and Chiang Kai Shek’s 
Taiwan, in the context of a North-South divide in the Korean Peninsula and the 
idea of communist containment in the wake of World War II. This was indeed a 
proposed version of NATO  for the Asia-Pacific. Evidently, this idea did not ma-
terialize, mainly because the Americans opted for a kind of approach based on 
bilateral alliances to secure stability and their presence in the region throughout 
the Cold War. This did not stop Seoul from trying to promote a regional agenda, 
especially in 1960s under the authoritarian government. As security became 
granted by the US hub-and-spoke system of military alliances, the focus turned 
to economic development and access to overseas markets. South Korea’s lead-
er, Major General Park Chung-hee, suggested an Asian Economic Cooperation 
Group; however, this could not materialize in the absence of official diplomatic 
ties between Seoul and Tokyo.24 
The prospects of a normalization of relations between South Korea 
and Japan — which was finally achieved in 1965 — provided a good context 
22  Higgott and Timmermann, “Institutionalizing East Asia,” 52-53.
23  Author’s interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the Re-
search Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012. 
24  Ibid.
for the creation of the Asian-Pacific Council (ASPAC), which emerged in late 
1964 as a diplomatic initiative put forward by Seoul. Park argues: “The materi-
alization of this organization and its secretariat established in the ROK was very 
important and meaningful for the Koreans until the mid 1970s.”25 The founding 
members of this group were all non-communist American or Western allies in 
the Asia-Pacific, such as Australia, the Republic of China, Japan, the ROK, Ma-
laysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. 
Although from its inception ASPAC had to accommodate competing interests, 
in practice it became an informal consultative forum similar to the ones in place 
nowadays in the region. ASPAC’s demise came a decade after its foundation 
in the wake of China’s emergence from the Cultural Revolution and the Fall 
of Saigon in 1975. Today, ASPAC is largely ignored by scholars, but its value 
should not be underestimated. For over ten years during some of the most criti-
cal moments of the Cold War, ASPAC — a South Korean-led initiative based 
in Seoul — provided the only East Asian regional framework for dialogue and 
consultation. What remains debatable about this regional institution is whether 
it left any legacy that could be traced in the post-Cold War regional frame-
works existing today. The informal and consultation-oriented way supports the 
argument that ASPAC provided the conditions for an embryonic development 
of what is well known today as the ‘ASEAN Way’ or ‘Asia-Pacific Way’ that 
characterizes the functioning of most regional organizations, as ASEAN itself 
— although founded in 1967 — did not become consolidated and regularly held 
until the 1980s. The intrinsic nature of the functioning of East Asian regional 
institutions could have been forged in Seoul instead of Singapore.
Nevertheless, today, most scholars identify two events as the precon-
ditions for East Asia to start thinking about a “modern” form of regional insti-
tutionalization. The first one is the end of the Cold War and the environment it 
provided for the prospects of a new regional and global order. In this context 
it was the Korean president Roh Tae-woo who initially proposed the idea of a 
multilateral dialogue to tackle security issues in Northeast Asia.26 This was pos-
sible thanks to South Korea’s normalization of relations with both China and 
the USSR in the late 1980s. Seoul’s proposal was presented to the UN General 
25  Ibid.
26  Sook-jong Lee, “Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism,” in East Asian Multilateralism 
Prospects for Regional Stability, eds. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008), 198- 213. 
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Assembly in 1988 and it was dubbed as the “Consultative Conference for Peace 
in Northeast Asia,” which expected to bring together the same six members 
that would eventually constitute the Six-Party Talks. Despite what has been 
described above, many see this Korean initiative as the commencement of a 
regional policy in Seoul under the new Sixth Republic, with a primary focus on 
the integration processes of Northeast Asia.27 This focus prevailed throughout 
the next decade. In 1994, the ROK tried again to start a similar initiative at the 
Asia Regional Forum Senior Officials’ Meeting in Bangkok.28 Although without 
much success initially, these examples are evidence of Seoul’s primary inter-
est in promoting multilateral frameworks among its neighbors, which could be 
understood from a balance of power prospective to the issue, as Lee suggests, 
since the ROK is indeed a smaller nation surrounded by regional and global 
powers.29
The second and most emphasized event that triggered regional insti-
tutionalization in East Asia is the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. The region-
al horizon of policymakers in Seoul was broadened by the critical juncture 
brought about by the AFC, which had made evident the necessity of closer ties 
between the advanced Northeast Asian countries and the developing countries 
in Southeast Asia.30 This contingency was very influential, although the ROK 
was already actively involved in regional institutionalization processes before 
the financial crisis broke out. For instance, it is widely acknowledged in the re-
gion that within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Seoul’s 
mediation was central and it played an instrumental role for the simultaneous 
inclusion of the “three Chinas” — namely the PRC, the ROC and Hong Kong 
— as three distinct members of this regional dialogue in 1991.31 Moreover, dur-
ing the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-98) under the so-called “New Di-
plomacy” and the growing interdependence with surrounding countries, South 
Korea became highly proactive in a variety of regional dialogues such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue 
27  Jae-woo Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” in 
Governance and Regionalism in Asia, ed. N. Thomas (London: Routledge, 2009), 93-115.
28  Lee, “Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism,” 199.
29  Ibid.
30  Most scholars agree on this point, among them some of the Korean experts revised: Choo, “South 
Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” and also Lee, “Korean Perspectives on 
East Asian Regionalism.” 
31  Sung-hoon Park and Jeong-yeon Lee, “APEC at a Crossroads: Challenges and Opportunities,” 
Asian Perspective 33, no. 2 (2009): 97-124.
(NEACD), the Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASD), the Council of Se-
curity Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM).32 All these multilateral frameworks involved Track 2 or the so-called 
Track 1.5 security related talks which served well Korean interests at the time 
since they implied a parallel track to the government-driven process. 
In sum, Park Young-june explains that despite some setbacks and 
several political changes brought about by the democratic transition in South 
Korea, there has been a certain level of coherence in trying to build regional 
institutions among policymakers in Seoul. Park argues that the reason for this 
has always been geostrategic; as Seoul saw itself isolated from the rest of Asia 
in its immediate neighborhood — because of North Korea on one side and hav-
ing historical conflicts with Japan on the other — it sought to develop regional 
frameworks to ensure its security, promote cooperation and develop new mar-
kets as the country underwent rapid industrialization. This tendency towards 
regional institutionalism eventually became embedded in South Korea’s foreign 
policy.33     
South Korea’s Shift to Modern Regionalism
The 1997-98 crisis was indeed the turning point for the ROK to embrace “mod-
ern” regionalism in East Asia following a more inter-govermentalist approach 
to institution building and governance: “The crisis made Korea realize the vul-
nerability of its economy to exogenous shock and the depth of its integration 
with the region. Hence, the negative lesson from the crisis was a positive cata-
lyst for Korea’s commitment to East Asian regionalism.”34 Before this event, 
South Korea viewed its national interests as strongly grounded in trans-Pacific 
cooperation; thus, when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir famously suggest-
ed the idea of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), it was the ROK and 
Japan that reacted in a more skeptical way, considering their close political and 
economic ties with the US.35 The AFC changed this mentality in Seoul. While 
the previous emphasis on Northeast Asia and security issues was justified by 
South Korea’s circumstances as a divided nation under constant threat from 
32  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges.”
33  Author’s interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the Re-
search Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012.
34  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” 98.
35  Lee, “Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism,” 201.
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the North, the political and economic landscape shifted due to the Asian crisis. 
Some even argue that the problems the Asian financial crisis underscored within 
South Korea — which was badly hit by the financial turmoil and the effects of 
crony capitalism — helped the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung win the presi-
dential election in 1997.36
In the wake of the AFC, Kim’s administration (1998-2002) was the 
first ROK government to embrace and push for the idea of an East Asian re-
gional community. Park Young-june argues that President Kim Dae-jung was 
undoubtedly the most active Korean leader in forming regional institutions and 
a cooperation network: “Even Japanese and Chinese still highlight President 
Kim’s contributions.”37 This shift was clear, as Seoul opted for a new definition 
of its geographical borders in East Asia, based upon the ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT) framework that emerged in this context — which excluded the United 
States as well as other Pacific countries such as Australia and New Zealand.38 
This meant that South Koreans had to review their position of “open region-
alism” as it was pursued within the APEC framework, which became largely 
dominated by the Americans. Lee argues this also meant a change in identity 
expressed in Korea’s diplomacy particularly towards Japan but also in pursuing 
economic agreements instead of concentrating so much on traditional security 
aspects. The so-called “forward-looking policy” proposed under President Kim 
serves as a good example of how Korea attempted to downgrade the sometimes 
conflictive nationalist sentiments, showing regional leadership in resolving sen-
sitive historical issues as this policy “was based on the idea that common East 
Asian identity and Japan’s cooperation would be needed to foster prosperity 
and peace in the region.”39 This sense of collective destiny was reinforced by 
the negative experiences with the IMF and the World Bank that most troubled 
East Asian countries encountered as a result of the AFC.40 In this context the 
APT became the axis of East Asian regionalism as it included the three ad-
vanced economies of Northeast Asia, which account for about 90 percent of the 
36  Ibid., 202.
37  Author’s interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the Re-
search Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012. 
38  Sung-han Kim, “Northeast Asian Regionalism in Korea,” in New Regional Security Architecture 
for Asia, CFR project, directed by Sheila A. Smith, Council on Foreign Relations (2009), www.cfr.org/con-
tent/ publications/.../NEAsia SecurityKim.pdf  (accessed January 20, 2012).
39  Lee, “Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism,” 203.
40  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges.” 
region’s GDP as a whole.41
South Korea immediately became enthusiastic about this new frame-
work, and during Kim’s presidency it actively developed region-oriented poli-
cies. East Asian regionalism became in this period one of the major pillars for 
the ROK’s foreign policy, as it was seen as a viable means to promote peace and 
prosperity in the region.42 President Kim Dae-jung saw the Korean Peninsula 
issue and its possible solution as part of a broad regional network including 
neighboring countries in NEA, thus the emphasis on regional institutionaliza-
tion during his government, in addition to the well-known “Sunshine Policy” of 
engagement with North Korea. Hence, the foundations of the Six-Party Talks 
were laid during this period: “For President Kim, the issue of regional coop-
eration and institutionalization was intertwined with the chances of improving 
inter-Korean relations.”43  
Yet, the most significant of many initiatives trying to build an East 
Asian Community was the formation of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) 
that president Kim Dae-jung announced at the 1998 APT summit meeting in 
Hanoi, in addition to the creation of the East Asia Study Group (EASG), to al-
low the academic and private sector become involved in finding out ways to fur-
ther cooperation within the APT countries. As Choo explains, in the launching 
and support of these initiatives South Korea was very vocal in advocating for 
regulatory frameworks for regional governance. Seoul “proactively assumed a 
leadership role in harmonizing different policy opinions that surfaced naturally 
during political debates and negotiations at the meetings of these two groups.”44 
Under this kind of constructive leadership the ROK was able to coordinate the 
final 26 policy recommendations that stem from the EASG. Those measures not 
only included economic and financial cooperation, but also political, security, 
environmental, energy, cultural, educational, social and institutional types of 
measures. In accordance with its mandate, the EASG submitted its final report 
to the APT Summit in Cambodia in 2002 in which it also assessed recommenda-
tions for the EAVG and the implications of an East Asia Summit, which became 
a reality a few years later. Among those seventeen short-term and nine long-
41  Lee, “Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism,” 204.
42  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” 99.
43  Author’s interview with Young-june Park, Ph.D., Head of Center for Military Affairs at the  
Research Institute for National Security, Korea National Defense University. March 14, 2012. 
44  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” 99.
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term concrete measures proposed in the EASG final report, some that stand out 
are highlighted below, as they are considered here to contribute specifically to 
regional institutionalization:
• Form an East Asia Business Council;
• Establish an East Asia Investment Information Network;
• Build a network of East Asian think-tanks;
• Establish an East Asia Forum;
• Establish poverty alleviation programs;
• Strengthen mechanisms for cooperation on non-traditional
 security issues;  
• Work together with cultural and educational institutions to
  promote a strong sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness;
• Promote East Asian studies in the region;
• Form an East Asia Free Trade Area;
• Pursue the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit into an East
 Asian Summit;
• Promote closer regional marine environmental cooperation for
 the entire region;
• Build a framework for energy policies and strategies, and action
 plans.45 
    
Consequently, Seoul strove as the organizer and host of most of these related 
meetings that culminated in the hosting of the inaugural summit of the East Asia 
Forum in December 2003.46 The change of administrations, however, meant a 
halt in the support of some of these regional initiatives started by Kim Dae-jung. 
With President Roh Moo-hyun, the emphasis on regional institutionalization 
shifted back to Seoul’s immediate neighborhood of Northeast Asia. This new 
approach did not contradict previous efforts, as many Korean authors point out, 
but it responded mainly to strategic concerns and to the necessity of institution-
alization of the relations between the big regional players in Northeast Asia, 
45  Final Report of the East Asia Study Group. Presented at the ASEAN + 3 Summit, on 4th of No-
vember, 2002. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Official document available online through Japan’s MOFA website, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf (accessed December 4th, 2011).
46  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges;” and Lee, 
“Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism.”
particularly in the economic aspects, but not exclusively.47 This shift serves to 
illustrate this paper’s assumption of Northeast Asian institutionalization as a 
necessary step to advance East Asian-wide regionalism. In his inaugural speech, 
Roh proclaimed the idea of a “Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace 
and Prosperity” and also emphasized the role of Korea in this framework as a 
“hub” in NEA, creating a special Presidential Committee for this purpose un-
der the initial name of “Northeast Asian Business Hub” in 2003 and changing 
its name in 2004 to “Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative” to work on the 
creation of policy and governance promotion.48 From the early days of his new 
administration, Roh “highlighted a strategic message that Korea should be a 
“bridge” linking continental and maritime powers, a hub of ideas and interre-
gional networks, and cooperation catalyzing a regional community of peace and 
prosperity.”49 This important shift was the ROK’s response to the stalemate in 
regional power structures arising mainly from competing agendas and the Sino-
Japanese rivalry that implied two different views in regards to the way in which 
East Asian integration should be carried out. Indeed many see Seoul as the only 
regional actor with the potential to assume an intermediate role between Japan 
and China:50
China and Japan’s unwillingness to cooperate on regional affairs, coupled 
with an easily upset bilateral relationship, has pulled them in different direc-
tions with respect to the building of the East Asian Community (EAC). The 
fundamental level of their disagreements was revealed at the inaugural meet-
ing of the EAS, when Japan insisted on – and China opposed – the member-
ship of Australia and New Zealand. Under these circumstances, it seems that 
the balancing role of middle powers such as Korea is more important than 
ever if the region is sincere about building the EAC.51
Nevertheless, Choo remains skeptical, since in practice the ROK as a middle 
power has not fully succeeded in asserting itself as leader in regional affairs be-
cause the region is highly dominated by a number of great powers. This means 
Seoul still has difficulty in trying to influence the development of the region’s 
47  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges;” Lee, “Korean 
Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism;” and Kim, “Northeast Asian Regionalism in Korea.”
48  Lee, “Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism.”
49  Kim, “Northeast Asian Regionalism in Korea,” 2.
50  Rozman, “Northeast Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads: Is an East Asian Community in sight?”
51  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” 106.
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normative structure.52
Current Approach to the Region
Since he took power in 2008, Lee Myung-bak seems likely to continue the 
ROK’s commitment to the region and its institutionalization process with a 
certain emphasis on Northeast Asia while keeping the APT as the main vehi-
cle to advance East Asian integration. In the meantime, the EAS has invited 
other extra-regional actors to balance the influential presence of China and its 
rivalry with Japan. Continuing with his predecessors’ tradition of branding the 
ROK’s foreign policy with fancy names, Lee’s “New Asia Diplomacy” implies 
the broadening of Seoul’s diplomatic horizons in order to make greater contri-
butions to regional and global causes, which reflects middle power behavior. 
This is clearly seen in the ROK’s active and enthusiastic participation in several 
international frameworks, such as hosting the G20 summit in 2010. As part of 
the vision of a “Global Korea” — the name given to the current administration’s 
National Security Strategy — Seoul seeks to develop worldwide recognition as 
a constructive and developed member of the international community, while 
strengthening cooperative partnerships with Southeast Asia, Central Asia, India, 
Australia and New Zealand as a way to initiate a new “Asian Era.”53
Indeed, President Lee’s diplomatic priorities are pragmatic and realist, 
where bilateral and key partnerships weigh heavily against multilateralism. The 
current leadership in Seoul has been undertaking a “creative pragmatic” ap-
proach in its diplomatic efforts to develop the ROK into a global nation in order 
to realize a vision of an “advanced and prestigious country.”54 This pragma-
tism, however, is not seen as mutually exclusive with the ROK’s ongoing good-
neighbor policy and the construction of a “Cooperative Network for Northeast 
Asia” where multilateralism becomes institutionalized. This remains a major 
priority and top challenge within Lee’s major agendas.55 (Figure 2: Global Ko-
rea Strategy) In this context, the enhancement of the Trilateral Cooperation 
52  Ibid.
53  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, Global Korea: The National Security 
Strategy of the Republic of Korea, 2009, http://www.mofat.go.kr (accessed February 20, 2012).
54  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, Diplomatic White Paper 2009, http://
www.mofat.go.kr (accessed February 20, 2012).
55  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, Global Korea: The National Security 
Strategy of the Republic of Korea.
Meetings of the CKJ group is the most recent example of the importance Seoul 
is giving to the issue of institutionalization of Northeast Asia. This tripartite 
summit that took form in the context of the AFC and the creation of the APT 
framework has been in recent years consolidated as the main channel for dia-
logue among the three major NEA actors, putting South Korea at the center of 
shaping the institutionalization of cooperation between China and Japan. It is 
clear for Seoul’s policymakers that “there is greater need to strengthen trilateral 
cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan as a way to enhance East Asia’s 
standing and role in the international community, and collectively address key 
challenges confronting Northeast Asia.”56
2008 was a year of great progress for trilateral cooperation between 
South Korea, China and Japan. For the first time, the Trilateral Summit was 
held in the territory of one of the three countries — in Fukuoka, Japan — inde-
pendently from the APT meetings. On the occasion, the three leaders adopted a 
joint statement agreeing to hold the high-level exchanges more regularly, which 
for Seoul was especially meaningful since the Koreans have been suggesting 
for years that the summit should be held on a regular basis. The adoption of the 
ROK-Japan and ROK-China agreements on currency swap deals, each of $30 
billion to cope with the global financial crisis, reflected the commitment of the 
three countries to put their collaborative efforts into action and the importance 
given to the role of South Korea in these schemes.57 Additionally, in 2010 the 
three countries adopted the so-called “Vision 2020,” a blueprint for  trilateral 
cooperation which outlines the future prospects of this multilateral framework 
by establishing a series of concrete tasks to accomplish in five fields, including: 
Institutionalization and Enhancement of the Trilateral Partnership, Sustainable 
Economic Cooperation for Common Prosperity, Cooperation in Sustainable 
Development and Environmental Protection, Promotion of Friendly Relations 
through the Expansion of Human and Cultural Exchanges and Joint Efforts for 
Regional and International Peace and Stability.58
With the fourth high-level meeting concluded successfully in 2011, 
the now regularized dialogue also includes ministerial talks on similar issues 
— namely culture, foreign affairs, trade and environment — while the decision 
56  Ibid.
57  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, Diplomatic White Paper 2009.
58  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, Diplomatic White Paper 2011, http://
www.mofat.go.kr (accessed February 20th, 2012).
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to create a permanent secretariat in the ROK was a remarkable step in putting 
Seoul at the heart of the process, something that has indeed become embedded 
in South Korea’s approach to regional institutionalization of NEA. Although the 
three countries came together initially to respond to economic interdependence: 
“this exchange has led to an expansion of trilateral cooperation to address new 
security challenges.”59 It is true that the Seoul-based secretariat has been envi-
sioned to serve as a coordinating body, and even though the three parties weigh 
equally in the agenda setting at least in theory, the functional contributions of 
the ROK’s role as coordinator shows once again the country’s display of middle 
power behavior, bridging between the two regional giants, showing a similar 
kind of leadership it showed ten years ago when promoting the EAGV. These 
examples illustrate well how middle powers can function as catalysts, facilita-
tors and managers to promote cooperation.
It is true that in terms of leadership affiliation, as most Korean schol-
ars point out, Seoul’s espousal of open regionalism places it much closer to 
Tokyo’s set of norms than to the East Asian-exclusive mindset prevalent in Bei-
jing.60 Nevertheless, if we take a look at the meetings and summits that the ROK 
has attended with China, these actually outnumber the ones held with Japan 
on a bilateral basis in recent years. Seoul is indeed paying more attention to 
its relations with China than with Japan. For instance, in 2010 the ROK held 
24 high-level meetings with China, which is an average of two exchanges per 
month; and only sixteen meetings of the same kind with Japan, many of which 
took place under other multilateral contexts.61 This can be seen as a way to bal-
ance the fact that Japan, as well as the ROK, is a US ally, while China — which 
has become South Korea’s major trade partner — is not and it remains the one 
country in the region with some leverage over North Korea. Seoul may also 
be paying more attention to Beijing in order to gain its support for its regional 
leadership aspirations in pragmatic and functional issues. China’s response to 
Korean initiatives in regional institutionalization can determine their degree of 
success and legitimacy. 
Finally — and despite the emphasis of this article on more exclusively 
East Asian regional frameworks — it is important to highlight that due to the 
59  See-woon Byun, “The China-South Korea-Japan Triangle: The Shape of Things to Come?” Asia 
Pacific Bulletin, no. 115 (Washington: East-West Center, June 6, 2011). 
60  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” 108.
61  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, Diplomatic White Paper 2011.
reality of the North Korean threat and the strategic relevance of the ROK-US 
security alliance, keeping the Americans involved in the region remains one 
of Seoul’s top priorities in their current approach to the region. This has been 
reflected in the strengthening of the alliance in recent years and the support for 
US membership in institutions like the ARF and the EAS, which are based on 
open regionalism. In essence, the Lee Myung-bak administration believes in the 
synergies between multilateralism and East Asian regionalism on the one hand, 
and the strategic bilateral alliances and partnership on the other, which is clearly 
depicted in President Lee’s strategic vision for a Global Korea (see image on 
next page).
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Conclusion
This paper explores a regional level of analysis to examine the contributions and 
the possible effects of South Korea’s regional leadership — conceptualized as a 
middle power in the region — in the processes of the institutionalization of East 
Asia. Certainly, it is very diffi cult to accurately measure a country’s leadership 
role in these types of processes. According to some authors62 South Korea as a 
middle power has yet to fully consolidate itself as a regional leader. This might 
be especially true when it comes to the recognition as such by other players in 
the region. The prospects are still not clear as on how much Seoul can really 
achieve as a leader of East Asian regionalism without the legitimate support 
and consensus of the other two regional powers, regardless of whether this is 
ultimately manifested as a purely coordinating or also as an agenda setting role. 
Indeed, the examples given illustrate the behavioral approach to un-
derstanding middle powers as catalysts, facilitators and managers to promote 
cooperation. Seoul’s role of coordinator is extremely relevant in this case as it 
takes the responsibility away from Beijing or Tokyo, who would feel more un-
comfortable when having to deal with each other directly. For instance, a mutual 
agreement was made among the leaders of the three NEA countries after the Ko-
reans insisted on the need to establish a permanent secretariat for the Trilateral 
Cooperation Meeting. As its 2011 Diplomatic White Paper suggests, through 
the establishment of this administrative body, it is expected that South Korea 
will continue its contributions to the consolidation and institutionalization of 
the trilateral cooperation as well as playing a facilitating role in its develop-
ment.63 Accordingly, it is plausible to argue that regarding the institutionaliza-
tion of Northeast Asia, Seoul’s leadership appears to be a more accommodating 
and preferable option to build consensus and trust among the other two regional 
powers in the region,64 similar to the role ASEAN has taken in the East Asian-
62 Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges.”
63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, Diplomatic White Paper 2011.
64 At the opening ceremony of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul last year the Chinese  
ambassador Zhang Xinsen said the establishment of the new body in Korea was an important step to realize 
the consensus among the three countries. Although less explicit, the Japanese Ambassador Muto Masatoshi 
stressed the shared responsibilities among the parties based on the principles of openness, transparency and 
mutual trust. The ROK assumed the fi rst leadership of the new institution, with Shin Bong-kil, South Ko-
rea’s former ambassador for international economic cooperation, acting as Secretary-General. In the occa-
sion he argued that the secretariat holds signifi cant potential in the context of Korea’s regional diplomacy. 
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7606468.html; and http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail. 	  
Figure 2: Current “Global Korea” Foreign Policy Strategy
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wide community building process. In turn, this elevates the ROK’s regional 
status by allowing it to exert leadership and a certain leverage over the process.
In sum, South Korea’s leadership as a middle power should be judged 
on whether or not it has successfully advanced the common interests of a group 
of states.65 This unfortunately remains a task extremely hard to fulfill in the 
presence of strong rivalry and mistrust between the main regional actors. Those 
common interests, however, are increasingly being successfully pursued in sev-
eral functional areas in which Seoul has constructively contributed to the build-
ing of regional frameworks at an inter-governmental level. Its efforts should not 
be underestimated, since South Korea has increased its commitment to serve as 
a bridge for Northeast Asian cooperation and East Asian community building. 
By actively supporting and promoting regional initiatives through its foreign 
policy Seoul has more than once acted as a catalyst, facilitator and manager of 
processes related to the institutionalization of cooperation among its neighbors. 
The ROK as a regional middle power can thus be considered an important driv-
ing force when institutionalizing East Asia. PEAR
jsp?newsMLId=20110927000898, accessed April 16th, 2012).
65  Choo, “South Korea and East Asian Regionalism, Policies, Norms and Challenges,” 107.






The relations of wealth and power that define capitalism as a global sys-
tem were created, in part, by long term, large scale processes subsumed by 
policy discourse and practice associated with the term “counterinsurgency.” 
Institutionally and practically, counterinsurgency coordinates coercive state 
institutions (military, police and intelligence) in a multipronged attack, 
including “civic action” and economic development, against an internal, 
armed rival. At the structural level, counterinsurgency is one of the politi-
cal processes that creates and constitutes the spatial and developmental un-
evenness that characterizes the interstate system and world economy, asym-
metrically driving militarization across the uneven zones of world systems. 
Historically, this military doctrine emerged to consolidate the colonial rule 
of the expanding empires of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. 
It rose to prominence in order to manage decolonization in the mid-twen-
tieth century and has returned in the last decade to deal with the increas-
ingly acute social problems of the neoliberal period. It is a world-relational 
process because, across all these periods, it connects the varied outcomes of 
state formation across the wide gulfs of power and wealth that characterize 
capitalism. In contemporary cases like Afghanistan, Chechnya, Columbia, 
Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen, and reflecting its emergence out 
of the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century, counterinsurgency has involved the lead effort 
by a strong state or the subsidization of a weaker one. 
From Vietnam to Homeland Security
My interest in counterinsurgency began with efforts to understand the signifi-
cance of my former Congressman, Robert Simmons. In his first campaign in 
